

New British Ministry of Defence Review Paper Shreds Case for Women in Ground Close Combat (GCC)

Section B

Claims that Problems Cited in New British Co-Ed Combat Report Can be "Mitigated" Are Not Credible

Background & Overview

In December 2014, the **British Ministry of Defence (MoD)** issued a report reviewing the issue of **Women in Ground Close Combat (GCC)**.¹ Unlike previous MoD reports on the same subject in 2002 and 2010, this one appears to have been written by one faction and edited by another. The result is a conflicted document, but one that includes specific, highly relevant information.

One of the two factions set forth detailed information that justifies current policies exempting women from ground close combat units, in the interests of **combat effectiveness (CE)**. Citations refer to empirical evidence based on actual experience, not theory.

The second faction appears to have inserted inconsistent statements to soften the impact of facts in the report. Many of these incongruous statements beg the question by assuming truth without evidence other than the statement itself.

Suggestions on how to "mitigate" problems lace the document throughout, reflecting social theories and unrealistic expectations that are contradicted by science and data presented in the same British report.

The word "mitigate" is usually paired with words like "damage" or "harm." Frequent use of the word throughout the British report suggests consequences that are negative, not positive. Logic would argue that major problems affecting combat effectiveness could and should be avoided by retaining current policies that exempt women from direct ground combat units such as the **infantry, armor, artillery, and Special Operations Forces**.

For purposes of comparison and clarity, the **Center for Military Readiness (CMR)** has prepared a two-part analysis of the British report. **Section A** sets forth multiple findings and data that clearly define close combat, its physical requirements, and gender-specific physiological differences. Unlike support units that serve "in harm's way," subject to contingent or incidental combat, the units in question now are "tip of the spear" fighting teams that attack the enemy on land with deliberate offensive action.²

In this Section B, CMR analyzes claims that most problems identified in the British report can be sufficiently "mitigated." (As in Section A, original spellings are used and emphasis is added throughout.) An objective reading of both perspectives in both sections A and B would suggest that speculative claims and beliefs cannot compare with documented data and findings in the new British report.

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1. Recommendation. The first sentence in the report, which was reported without question in some news reports, recommends a *"positive approach towards the [women in ground close combat (GCC)] question."* The report adds, *"If this research demonstrates that the steps necessary to mitigate the risks are **grossly disproportionate in terms of time, resources and cost, lawful exclusion may have to remain in place.**"* (p. 5, #18d)

Response: In truth, research information presented throughout the 2014 report indicates that risks and costs would be grossly disproportionate. The report suggests caution and prudent consideration of the consequences of flawed policies that would harm both women and men. As tests in Britain and the United States over the past 30 years have repeatedly shown, women do not have an equal opportunity to survive, or help fellow soldiers survive, in a direct ground combat environment.³ The burden of proof for change in policies that exempt women from close combat assignments simply has not been met.

2. What is the case for change? Maximising talent. *"There is increasing competition for those in the recruiting pool, which will continue to change in character; arguably potential recruits are becoming less physically robust, but are likely to be better educated and more technically able. These challenges will require the Services to maximise the available talent. Much of this currently untapped talent pool is female."* (p. 1, #7)

Response: The personal talents, accomplishments, and courage of female recruits are not in question. The report clearly states, however, that combat survivability and lethality would be negatively affected by **physiological differences that cannot be mitigated.** These include: a.) **Physical capability;** b) **Morbidity and deployability;** and c) **Survivability and lethality.** (pp. 3-4, #18a - 18c) There is no citation to support the implied claim that education and technical expertise alone can compensate for physical deficiencies that affect combat effectiveness. Nor is there any support for the implied claim that there aren't enough men to serve in the combat arms, or any discussion of projected high risks and operational costs if women are assigned to the combat arms.

3. External perceptions. *"By removing the exclusion, the Services will be viewed as a **genuine meritocracy**, where all who are capable of attaining the employment standards have the opportunity to succeed in any career underpinning the principle of equality of opportunity. This would make the Services more attractive to talented women."* (p. 2, #8)

Response: There is no citation supporting this narrative. Nor is it likely that potential adversaries would be impressed or deterred by gender diversity in a British military that accepts degraded CE for the sake of ideological goals. In fact, the philosophy of "gender diversity metrics," recommended by the Pentagon-endorsed **Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC)** is not about recognition of individual merit or an end to discrimination against individuals. Rather, the MLDC is calling for demographic group rights and "gender diversity metrics," another name for quotas.⁴ Implementation would replace true merit-based standards with lower-but-equal "gender-neutral" standards that would leave men less prepared for direct ground combat and women exposed to resentment they do not deserve.

4. *"The assessment of benefits was to include the impact of a change in policy on the **recruitment of women into the wider Armed Forces.** . . ."* (p. 3, #14)

Response: The report does not include any evidence that recruitment would improve if women were eligible for the combat arms on the same basis as men. The only internal electronic poll cited in the MoD report found that more than half of respondents (**54%**) were opposed to GCC assignments. Only **34%** were in favor with **12%** undecided. (p. 3, #16)

Recent surveys of propensity to serve in the U. S. military indicate that direct ground combat assignments would make potential recruits *less likely* to volunteer, not more likely.⁵ In addition, attrition rates for female U.S. Marine boot camp trainees are **double** those of men. This has been the case even though a minimum **3 pull-up** requirement that was tried in 2013 had to be suspended when **55%** of female trainees could not do the pull-ups.⁶

5. How the review was conducted and what it found - 2014 review. *"The review was based on the premise that all roles should be open to women unless this would undermine CE. SofS [MoD Secretary of State] directed that Armed Forces' effectiveness was not to be prejudiced by lowering operationally necessary standards."* (p. 3, #14)

Response: The paper does not meet the burden of proof needed to justify *"the premise that all roles should be open to women."* On the contrary, the British report includes abundant evidence that inclusion of a cohort of people known to be significantly deficient in qualities such as physical strength, endurance, deployability, and survivability would make it necessary to lower operationally necessary standards.

6. Conduct of the review. *"The review considered whether it was appropriate to remove the current exclusions; initiatives to create new capabilities or organisations that seek to use female talent better were out of scope. This paper has been considered by Equality Analysis trained personnel to ensure that the outcome does not have a disproportionate impact on those in the Protected Characteristics groups."* (p. 3, #15)

Response: The first comment suggests a tunnel-visioned pursuit of pre-conceived objectives that are not necessarily helpful to women who want to serve their country without being treated like men. The second betrays misplaced priorities, putting "Equal Opportunity" (EO) ahead of the needs of the military.

The phrase *"disproportionate impact"* suggests demographic quotas to achieve egalitarian goals, even at the expense of CE, combat effectiveness. This process eventually would degrade training that is *"optimised for a male cohort, which has been proven to be effective in the most demanding of operational environments."* (p. 4, #18a, plus Annex C)

7. Physical capability. *"Screening and testing may identify those women who, with the right pre-conditioning and continuation training, would be less prone to this acute short term injury."* (p 4, #18a)

Response: This speculation is not supported by medical/scientific data or experience. As stated elsewhere in the report, *"Despite [physical] differences, there will be some women, amongst the physical elite, who will achieve the entry tests for GCC roles. But these women will be more susceptible to acute short term injury than men: in the Army's current predominantly single sex initial military training, women have a twofold higher risk of musculoskeletal (MSK) injury."* (p. 4, #18a) *Military forces are composed of average-sized men and women, not "physical elites" who are unlikely to volunteer for military service.*

8. Morbidity and deployability. Following a discussion of why disease, injury, and other long-term risks to the health of women employed in GCC roles are factors that **cannot be "mitigated,"** the report swerves into the realm of wishful thinking:

*"Physiological research will therefore need to identify the physical elite within the serving cohort of women in order to isolate the **representative cohort**. . . Mitigations may include measures such as a different and more scientific approach to fitness regimes, nutritional advice and supplements."* (p. 4, #18b)

Response: Volunteer forces cannot depend on recruiting "physical elites" alone, and there are no "scientific approaches" or nutritional supplements that can alter basic physiology.⁷ The British report states that in recent combat operations, there was a **15 to 20% higher rate of Disease Non-Battle Injury (DNBI) among female troops.** (p. 4, #18b) Tests in the United States have found that extra training can make women strong, but men become even stronger.⁸ Female Olympic athletes use the best fitness and nutritional programs to become as strong as possible. These women are part of the "physical elite." Still, female athletes do not compete against men in the Olympics. Nor do fleet-footed female runners compete with men in marathons or in the National Football League. Forcing them to do so would be dangerous as well as unfair.

9. Small Numbers. *"This area continues to pose risks to CE, but given that the number of those likely to achieve the physical requirement will be small, the risks are unlikely to be operationally significant. Moreover, if it is possible to design the correct selection and testing regime, only those who are physically capable, with low morbidity, will fill GCC roles."* (p. 4, #18c")

Response: It is irresponsible to suggest that unprecedented turmoil and incremental lowering of standards should be imposed on the combat arms just to benefit a theoretical tiny minority known to be at greater risk of injuries that, in turn, endanger colleagues and combat missions.

The theory also disregards the effect of pressures for a "*critical mass*" and "*significant cadre*" of women in the combat arms. **General Martin Dempsey (USA)** used these phrases at a January 24, 2013, Pentagon news conference. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also proposed what could be called the "**Dempsey Rule**," meaning: *If it's too hard for women, it's probably too hard.*⁹

10. Practicalities of implementation. Should policy change, a **resourced implementation programme** will be required . . . [to deliver] **cultural and practical change** . . . Guiding principles for implementation are at Annex E.¹⁰ (p. 5, #21)

Response: Disregarding inconvenient realities set forth elsewhere in the 2014 MoD report, Annex E recommends, for example, "*Pre-emptive implementation planning*" and "*gender-free*" physical employment standards. (p. E-2, #5) Authors of this section seem to have forgotten that in 1996, British military officials had to discontinue "gender-free" training after an 18-month experiment, primarily because female trainees' injuries soared to unacceptable levels.¹¹ The report's Annex B also states, "*At present, validated 'gender free' employment standards to monitor the suitability of women to perform GCC roles do not exist in the Field Army.*" (p. B2, #18) There is no explanation of how officials will

accomplish the transition from gender-specific (normed) standards to gender-neutral, but it is fair to assume that the plan will create "new standards" that are equal but lower than before.

11. Cultural Change. *"Implementation must include a cultural change programme to ensure there is **no impact on CE** and ensure women are **not career limited**."* (p. 5, #21a.)

Response: Annex 5 recommends "cultural change" based on "mitigation" measures that are "carefully controlled" and "de-risked." This fantasy ignores the true nature of ground close combat that, by definition, cannot be "controlled" or "de-risked." It also disregards the danger of putting into that environment personnel known to be less strong, less deployable, more vulnerable to debilitating injuries, and less lethal in deliberate offensive action against the enemy.¹²

Retired Army **General Frederick J. Kroesen** challenged the notion that infantry assignments would enhance women's careers: *"The advocates for this policy change do not seem to realize that assigning women to the Infantry will consign them to second-class status. Most will be less capable than their male counterparts, and their efficiency reports, always a comparative measurement, will have a negative impact on their assignments and promotions. Their careers will be affected—probably stunted—unless, of course, a quota system that will further reduce squad, platoon and company effectiveness is adopted."*¹³

12. Cost of Implementation. *"Infrastructure costs could range anywhere from a few thousand pounds up to 20m pounds over 10 years."* (p. 5, #21b and footnote #13.)

Response: These estimates are based on the need for **privacy arrangements that may or may not be offered**. Additional information in Annex 5 reports that some military officials have "independently advocated an " 'all of one company' approach to training (i.e., full integration of accommodation and ablutions), on the premise that cohesion is so central to the infantry role that **no segregation between males and females can be tolerated**. . . . As with the Army costing, the level of cost will depend on **the degree of male/female integration adopted**." (p. E-5, #14d, and footnotes #34 and #35)

This statement misconstrues the meaning of cohesion, which depends on mutual trust for survival.¹⁴ It also disregards what is known about normal characteristics of human beings, including sexual attraction. Ground combat units are composed of individuals aged between 18-22 – a maturing, but not fully mature group having normal human characteristics.

Given inappropriate behavior that is evident in all other military communities, both voluntary and involuntary, it is folly to expect human beings to be more perfect in the combat arms. Anything that erodes cohesion (and normal sexual tension certainly does) also lessens combat effectiveness. The practical effect of diminished CE is greater casualties and increased risk of mission failure.

13. Areas of Uncertainty. *"There remain considerable uncertainties surrounding physiology and its effect on survivability, lethality, morbidity and deployability. The US is researching these areas as part of their change programme, the results of which will contribute to UK decision making and implementation."* (p. 6, #22a)

Response: This understatement relies on research being conducted by the **U.S. Marine Corps** to resolve all questions and uncertainties. This is an unrealistic expectation, since USMC research results produced so far do not support activists' theories that women can be physical equals and interchangeable with men in the combat arms.¹⁵ The **USMC Ground Combat Element Integrated Task Force** experiments scheduled to operate in 2015 will use high-tech methods to compile information on physiology. Within the task force's mixed-gender units, however, loads will be shared in ways that obscure individual contributions. All units will be declared a big success, but skepticism is warranted. Contrary to early reports, it appears that there will be no control group comparisons between mixed-gender and all-male units.

14. Further research required to integrate women into GCC roles. *"Once a decision has been reached, the physiological research programme will continue to ensure that the essential prerequisites to the integration of women are delivered."* (p.7, #25)

Response: This position puts the cart before the horse, glossing over the lack of credible evidence that major problems can be significantly "mitigated."

15. Recommended course of action. *"This analysis led to three courses of action: to lift the exclusion now; to retain the exclusion; or to commit to further research and reduce physiological uncertainty. . . a) **Benefits.** Conducting concurrent implementation planning will allow a full cost benefit analysis to be produced before a final decision is made and would also fast-track integration if a decision to lift the exclusion is made in 2016. b) **Risks.** There could be a perception that this course of action is seen to be delaying the issue and therefore the Armed Forces do not realise the benefits sooner."* (p. 7, #26a and b)

Response: This conflicted argument continues to assume, despite the lack of empirical evidence, that "benefits" would result from policies that disregard overwhelming empirical evidence that discredits theories of gender equality in the combat arms.

16. Annex C, Tables of Factors Contributing to CE (Combat Effectiveness)

This 9-page section sets forth detailed descriptions of physically-demanding GCC roles that *"require the individual to be prepared to fight at close quarters."* The section also attempts *"to assess the potential impact on CE of the inclusion of women within the GCC team."* The MoD panel selected and assessed **21 factors** having an effect on CE, with two, physiology and team cohesion, identified as *"most relevant."* (pp. C-7 through C-9) The 21 factors, which are displayed on color-block graphs, are listed as follows:

a) **Positive.** **"Collective Work Experience,"** with the comment, *"Collective work experience will mitigate the effects of diversity in team cohesion."*

Response: The comment reflects confusion about differences between gender and racial diversity. Racial differences are only skin deep, and irrational prejudice was mitigated faster in the military than in the civilian world due to shared experiences and proven effectiveness in battle. Differences related to gender, however, are profound and related to physiological factors that are important for mission accomplishment and survival in battle.

b) **Neutral or Multi-directional.** Of the seven factors in this category, most were speculative and debatable, with the exception of "**Courage**," which women have demonstrated in the recent deployments before and during **Afghanistan** and **Iraq**.

Factors identified as "**Task Commitment**," "**Discipline**," and "**Motivation & Group Commitment**" were identified as "*Variable and difficult to quantify.*"

"**Peer Support**" and "**Collective Social Experience**" reflected focus group comments that "*males in groups were more willing to share their feelings with female group members...*" As for "**Morale**," the panel wishfully speculates: "*Morale will be maintained as long as trust remains (neutral) Should individuals lose trust in each other, morale will suffer (negative.)*"

Response: These designations, emphasizing "*feelings*," appear to have been put together by professional analysts trying hard to provide desired answers, but hedging with designations that are labeled "positive," "neutral" and "negative" in the same column. The resulting incoherence contrasts unfavorably with reality-based information in the same document.

c.) **Unknown.** The two factors in this category were "**Controlled Aggression**," which is not defined, and "**Mental Resilience**," a factor requiring "*further evidence.*"

d) **Negative.** The eleven factors likely to have a negative impact were listed as follows, with "mitigation" strategies shown in the same column (presented in non-consecutive order):

- "**Skill-Based Credibility**"¹⁶
- "**Male/Female Interaction**"¹⁷
- "**Concept of Protection**"¹⁸
- "**Sexual Relationships**"¹⁹
- "**Mental Health**"²⁰
- "**Critical Mass v. Tokenism**"²¹
- "**Bullying, Harassment, & Discrimination**"²²
- "**Physical Capability**"

Physical factors, explained in detail throughout the report, include "*fitness, endurance, and onset of fatigue.*" They account for the final three problematic factors, which are listed as "*significant challenges*" that probably cannot be mitigated. The three show-stoppers displayed in the block graph include:

- "**Survivability & Lethality**"²³
- "**Deployability**"²⁴
- "**Morbidity**"²⁵

Conclusion:

Balancing all 21 factors on a metaphorical scale leads to a logical conclusion: lawful exemption of women from ground close combat assignments should remain in place. At this point policy makers should pause and consider why the push for women in land combat should proceed any further. To show true respect for both women and men in the military, sound policies that preserve high standards and improve military readiness should be upheld and codified in law. ■

¹ [Women in Ground Close Combat \(GCC\) Review Paper – 01 December 2014](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/389575/20141218_WGCC_Findings_Paper_Final.pdf), available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/389575/20141218_WGCC_Findings_Paper_Final.pdf. Previous MoD reports (2002 and 2010) are available in the CMR website Essential Resources Section titled "[Diversity for Women in Land Combat.](#)"

² See CMR Policy Analysis, New British Ministry of Defence Review Paper Shreds Case for Women in Ground Close Combat (GCC), Section A, February 2015, available at: <http://cmrlink.org/data/sites/85/CMRDocuments/CMRPolicyAnalysisFebruary2015.pdf>

³ See Exhibit B, [Interim CMR Special Report, U.S. Marine Corps Research Findings: Where is the Case for Co-Ed Ground Combat?](#) available at: <http://www.cmrlink.org/data/sites/85/CMRDocuments/InterimCMRSpecRpt-100314.pdf>.

⁴ Final Report of the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC), [From Representation to Inclusion, Diversity Leadership for the 21st Century Military](#), March 2011. Unlike equal opportunity (EO) policies that reward individual merit, the push for "gender diversity metrics" advances group rights, not individual rights. The MLDC report, endorsed by the Department of Defense on February 9, 2012, admits that the new "diversity management" involves fair treatment, but "*it is not about treating everyone the same. This can be a difficult concept to grasp, especially for leaders who grew up with the EO-inspired mandate to be both color and gender blind.*" (p. 18)

⁵ **Joint Advertising, Market Research and Studies (JAMRS)**, briefing for the **Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS)**, March 2014, June 2014, and additional information obtained by CMR.

⁶ **USMC Response to DACOWITS Request for Information - RFI A4**", 4 December 2014, p. 2 and p. 4. The USMC report showed significant female attrition in the delayed entry program for recruits, and rates of attrition in Marine basic training that have been more than twice as high for the past four years, starting in FY 2011.

⁷ **RADM Hugh Scott, MC, USN (Ret.)**, letter titled "[Physical and Physiological Issues Associated with the Assignment of Women to Direct Ground Combat Units.](#)" June 22, 2012.

⁸ See several studies listed in the Interim CMR Special Report: [U.S. Marine Corps Research Findings: Where is the Case for Co-Ed Ground Combat?](#), Exhibit B. Studies quoted include a congressionally authorized 1996 study done by the US Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, usually called the [Natick Study](#), which was analyzed by CMR in [The Amazon Myth - Natick Study Stretches Science](#). The Natick Study failed to show that concentrated training could make women the physical equals of men.

William J. Gregor, PhD, Professor of Social Sciences, School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, KS, and author of [a paper](#) on physiology presented at the 2011 International Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, has said, "*There is no study that indicates that training can overcome the large physical differences between men and women. Additionally, training women to perform heavy work jobs increases dramatically the skeletal-muscular injury rate among women which is already far greater than men. Attempting to train women with men will require either training men less well or accepting a high attrition rate among the very few women who will meet the nominal qualifications for heavy work jobs.*" Also see **Paul O. Davis, PhD**, *Marine Corps Gazette*, "[Looking for a Few Good Women: Physical Demands of Combat](#)," July 2014.

⁹ Gen. Dempsey said that if "*a particular standard is so high that a woman couldn't make it, the burden is now on the service to come back and explain...why is it that high? Does it really have to be that high?*" Since the stated goal is "set women up for success," the answer will be "No."

¹⁰ Like similar vague references, **DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel, and Facilities)** factors are barely mentioned in the U.S. Defense Department's campaign to gender-integrate the combat arms. Annex E, titled "*Implementation Planning Proposal*" calls for sweeping cultural changes and expenditures and that have yet to be estimated, much less justified. See pages E-1 through E-5. These include already-tried-but-rejected "gender-free" training programs, "cultural change" education that would promote acceptance of compromised standards, plus expenditures for female-specific equipment and insurance to cover increased legal liability for expected injuries.

¹¹ **Michael Evans**, Defence Editor, Times On Line: [Women Pay Painful Price for Equal Military Training](#), March 22, 2005. This *London Times* article and accompanying graph showed the steep increases in injuries that ensued when "gender-free" training was temporarily used instead of "gender-fair" exercises that treated women and men differently, due to physical differences. Also see CMR, Jan. 3, 2002: [Co-Ed Training Damages Health of Female Soldiers](#).

¹² **Ian M. M. Gemmell**, *Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine*, "[Injuries Among Female Army Recruits: A Conflict of Legislation](#)," 2002 January. Excerpt: "[A] 'gender fair' policy was . . . changed to a 'gender free' policy, whereby identical physical fitness tests were used for selection of male and female recruits and the training programme made no allowances for gender differences.... The cross-gender (F/M) odds ratio for discharges because of overuse injury rose from 4.0...under the gender-fair system to 7.5... under the gender-free system. Despite reducing the number of women selected, the gender-free policy led to higher losses from overuse injuries."

¹³ Gen. Frederick Kroesen, USA (Ret.), *Army Magazine*, "[Infantrywomen: What the Evaluators Are Not Considering](#)," February 2015.

¹⁴ Presidential Commission Report, "*Characteristics of Cohesion – Cohesion is the relationship that develops in a unit or group where (1) members share common values and experiences; (2) individuals in the group conform to group norms and behavior in order to ensure group survival and goals; (3) members lose their personal identify in favor of a group identity; (4) members focus on group activities and goals; (5) unit members become totally dependent on each other for the completion of their mission or survival; and (6) group members must meet all standards of performance and behavior in order not to threaten group survival.*" CF 2.5.1, p. C-81. (emphasis added)

¹⁵ See full Interim CMR Special Report: "*Where is the Case for Co-Ed Combat?*" *supra* #3.

¹⁶ This item admits that "*perceptions are likely to remain fragile,*" and "*mitigation*" will require a "*Cultural change programme, education, and the individual proving their ability in the task.*" How this will be done if the individual is not capable of performance at levels suitable for men is not explained.

¹⁷ The panel admits, "*Distraction, competition, jealousy were considered predominate factors [but] strong task leadership and clear task focus could provide viable mitigation over time.*" If this expectation were realistic, actual incidents of sexual misconduct in the military would be decreasing instead of increasing. See CMR: "[Exploiting Sexual Assault in the Military](#)," January 30, 2015, which analyzes data produced by the Defense Department's 2014 Report of the Sexual Assault Prevention & Response Office (SAPRO), available at CMR's website, www.cmrlink.org.

¹⁸ This means, "*Males are biologically predisposed to protect females*" and "*opponents will seek to target those members of the GCC team that they perceive as most vulnerable.*" Management of this problem would involve "*training and education,*" presumably to persuade men that they should stifle their inclination to protect females. How would this "training" benefit women in the military, or anywhere else?

¹⁹ The panel admits that "*The potential for sexual relationships is likely to produce complication in relation to cohesion.*" This is a serious understatement, since most "mitigation" strategies have not met expectations in American and other allied forces.

²⁰ "*Military women have higher hospital mental health admittance than men*" and "*cope differently with stressors.*" Recommended mitigations, "*Training, support, shared experience, and cohesion*" (the latter being misdefined) would be of little help in reducing such problems.

²¹ The comment concedes that "*critical mass is unlikely to be achieved, resulting in gender stereotyping.*" It continues, "*Women may act in an unnatural way to attempt to fit in – this can cause emotional labour. It is thought that this problem will endure.*" Left unexplained is why women should be expected to "*act in a unnatural way*" if they want to serve their country.

²² The comment concedes that this problem is *"Linked closely to Critical Mass and considered a likely challenge."* Recommended *"[c]ultural change programmes"* have been tried before with limited success.

²³ The block graph states, *"[Work] has identified a correlation between load carriage and explosive power in relation to physiology. Those who are less strong with less explosive power will have a higher probability of becoming casualties. Similarly, an increased load in relation to physiology and fitness will decrease effectiveness of combat marksmanship and thus lethality."*

²⁴ As stated, *"The physiological differences between men and women pre-dispose females to a higher incidence of injury and thus medical downgrading than males . . . Thus, a female cohort is quantifiably less deployable than a male cohort."*

²⁵ As stated elsewhere in the report, *"British female personnel have about a 15% higher rate of disease non-battle injury (DNBI). These higher DNBI rates will be further exacerbated by findings from work on survivability, [meaning] that women will sustain a higher combat casualty rate than males."* The report adds, *"There are so many causes of morbidity it is difficult to achieve anything more than limited mitigation."*



The Center for Military Readiness, an independent public policy organization that specializes in military/social issues, has prepared this CMR Policy Analysis, which is not intended to support or oppose legislation. More information is available at www.cmrlink.org.